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"Buy American" Statutes: Should the
Market Participant Doctrine Shield
Pennsylvania's Steel Products Procurement
Act from Commerce Clause Scrutiny?
I. Introduction
In the Pennsylvania cities and towns of Pittsburgh, Homestead,
Rankin, Johnstown, Braddock, Duquesne, McKeesport, Monessen,
and Aliquippa, steel was king. Steel built the skyscrapers, built the
fortunes, and built the factories where generations of Pennsylvanians
earned a living for themselves and their families. Steel catapulted
the United States to the status of industrial and military superpower.
In 1950, over forty-five percent of the world's raw steel was pro-
duced in the United States1 - much of it in the mill towns of west-
ern Pennsylvania.
Just nine years later, however, United States steel imports ex-
ceeded exports for the first time in the twentieth century.2 During
the next three decades, the United States continued to be a net im-
porter of steel. In 1982, foreign steel imports reached a historical
high of twenty-four percent of United States steel consumption.3 The
forces that combined to bring about the demise of domestic steel
were numerous. Clearly one of the major problems which faced
United States steel producers was the flood of imported steel that
increased fourfold from 1963 to 1982."
Today, it is difficult to recall the dominance the United States
steel industry once enjoyed. Yet, the domestic steel industry remains
important to the economy of the United States and to the economy
of Pennsylvania. With average annual sales of almost $60 billion, it
is one of the largest industries in the nation.5 The steel industry is a
major source of employment, employing 500,000 wage and salaried
workers.e This amounts to approximately five percent of the nation's
1. DONALD F. BARNETT & Louis SCHORSCH, STEEL: UPHEAVAL IN A BASIC INDUSTRY
32 (1983).
2. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. STEEL IN-
DUSTRY 17 (1985) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL]; BARNETT & SCHORSCH,
supra note I, at 17.
3. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 96.
4. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 8, 96.
5. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 29.
6. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 29.
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total domestic work force. 7
Recognizing the great importance of the steel industry, in 1978
the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Steel Products Pro-
curement Act.8 The stated purpose of the Steel Act is to "aid and
promote the development of the steel industry of the United States
in order to stimulate and improve the economic well being of the
Commonwealth and its people."9 To serve this puropse, the Steel Act
mandates that every public agency in the Commonwealth, which en-
ters into a contract for the construction, alteration, or maintenance
of public works, require a provision that any steel products used in
the performance of the contract be from the United States.10 Pay-
7. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 29.
8. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1881-1887 (Supp. 1991).
9. Section 1883 provides:
It is hereby determined by the General Assembly of Penn:ylvania and declared
as a matter of legislative findings that:
(I) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is one of the leading states in
the United States in the production of steel.
(2) The production of steel products constitutes a major industry of the
Commonwealth and, as such, provides the jobs and family incomes of
hundreds of thousands of the people of this Commonwealth and, in turn,
millions of persons in the United States.
(3) The taxes paid to the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions by
employers and employees engaged in the production and sale of steel
products are one of the largest single sources of public revenues in this
Commonwealth.
(4) It has, for many years, been the policy of the Commonwealth to aid
and support the development and expansion of industry in this Common-
wealth in order to foster the economic well-being of the Commonwealth
and its people.
(5) The economy and general welfare of the Commonwealth and its peo-
ple, as well as the economy, general welfare and national security of the
United States, are inseparably related to the preservation and develop-
ment of the steel industry in the Commonwealth and n the other states
of the United States.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly therefore declares it to be the policy of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania that all public officers and agencies should, at all times, aid and pro-
mote the development of the steel industry of the United Statcs in order to stimulate and
improve the economic well-being of the Commonwealth and its people. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1883 (Supp. 1991).
10. Section 1884 provides:
(a) Every public agency shall require that every contract document for the con-
struction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, improvement or maintenance of pub-
lic works contain a provision that, if any steel products are to be used or supplied
in the performance of the contract, only steel products as herein defined shall be
used or supplied in the performance of the contract or any sub-contracts
thereunder.
Id. § 1884(a). Note, however, that this provision is not absolute. Section 1884 also provides:
(b) This section shall not apply in any case where the head of the public agency,
in writing, determines that steel products as herein defined are not produced in




ments under such contracts are not to be made until the public
agency receives certification from the contractor verifying the origin
of the steel."'
The Act is enforced by a double edged penalty provision. A vio-
lation by a contractor calls for the immediate withholding or recov-
ery of any payments by the public agency."2 The more severe penalty
in the Act prohibits a violating contractor from bidding on or per-
forming any public contract for a period of five years.' 3
"Buy American" laws such as the Steel Act are the result of
one of the hottest topics of political and economic debate of recent
years. With the United States' current balance of trade problems
and a perceived loss of competitiveness in the world market, it is
understandable why states may attempt to strengthen the domestic
economy by enacting these laws. But are such attempts constitu-
tional and proper exercises of state power?
After being in force for twelve years, the constitutionality of the
Steel Act was challenged as a violation of the Commerce Clause. In
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,'4 the Third Circuit Court
I1. Section 1885(a) provides:
(a) No public agency shall authorize, provide for or make any payments to any
person under any contract containing the provision required by Section 4 unless,
when identified steel products are supplied under a contract, such person has
provided documentation including, but not limited to, invoices, bills of lading,
and mill certification that the steel was melted and manufactured in the United
States, which establish that such person has fully complied with such provision.
If a steel product is identifiable from its face, such person must submit certifica-
tion which satisfies the public agency that such person has fully complied with
the provision required by Section 4 ....
Id. § 1885(a).
12. Section 1885(a) provides:
(a) Any such payments made to any person by any public agency which should
not have been made as a result of this section shall be recoverable directly from
the contractor, sub-contractor, manufacturer or supplier who did not comply
with Section 4 by either such public agency or the Attorney General of
Pennsylvania.
Id. § 1885(a).
13. Section 1885(b) provides:
(b) In addition to the withholding of payments, any person who willfully violates
any of the provisions of this act shall be prohibited from submitting any bids to
any public agency for any contract for a period of five years from the date of the
determination that a violation has occurred. In the event the person who violates
the provisions of Section 4(a) is a sub-contractor, manufacturer or supplier, such
person shall be prohibited from performing any work or supplying any materials
to a public agency for a period of five years from the date of the determination
that a violation has occurred.
Id. § 1885(b).
14. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, I I I S. Ct. 2814 (1991). The challenge was also asserted on the alternative basis of the
foreign affairs power and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Appellant's Brief,
Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-5057). These arguments are
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1992
of Appeals upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the Common-
wealth's right to participate in the market place. 15 This challenge
raises interesting questions regarding the applicability of the market
participant doctrine to such "buy American" statutes. Indeed, Tro-
jan Technologies addressed a question which the United States Su-
preme Court has expressly left unanswered. Thai. question is whether
state "buy American" statutes violate the Commerce Clause or are
permissible under the market participant doctrine. 6 This Comment
is a specific analysis of whether the market participant doctrine ap-
plies to the Steel Act. However, much of the analysis will apply to
other "buy American" statutes in effect in many states.'
7
Discussion will begin with a brief background of the legal and
economic significance of the Commerce Clause and the traditional
Supreme Court analysis of the Commerce Clause. The discussion
will then turn to the market participant doctrine. The role of the
doctrine as an exception to Commerce Clause analysis will'be em-
phasized. A brief survey of state "buy American" statutes will fol-
low, including a discussion of the sparse case law addressing the sub-
ject. The balance of the Comment will focus on Pennsylvania's Steel
Products Procurement Act. The Act will be analyzed in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions outlining the market par-
ticipant doctrine.
This Comment takes the position that application of the market
participant doctrine to the Steel Act is inappropriate given the
Court's construction of that doctrine. The application of the doctrine
will shield the Steel Act from. traditional Commerce Clause analysis
of the burden the Act places on commerce. This Comment concludes
by subjecting the Steel Act to this traditional analysis and sug-
gesting the probable outcome of the analysis.
The intent of this Comment is not to provide a definitive answer
to whether the Steel Act is constitutional. 8 The Commerce Clause
analysis is provided to demonstrate the important scrutiny that will
never take place if the Act receives the blanket protection of the
outside the scope of this Comment.
15. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915.
16. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980). Indeed, the Circuit Court in
Trojan Technologies acknowledged that it was addressing the question reserved in Reeves.
Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 915.
17. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
18. Such a comment would necessarily entail discussion of federal preemption, federal
foreign relations power, vagueness, and equal protection. These challenges were also asserted
in Trojan Technologies. See Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2814 (1990); see also Appellant's Brief, Trojan Technologies (No. 90-
5057).
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market participant exception. The position of this Comment is
merely that the Steel Act should face constitutionally mandated
scrutiny of whether the Act impermissibly burdens commerce, re-
gardless of the ultimate result. The market participant doctrine
should not be used- to justify what is clearly state regulation of for-
eign commerce.
II. Purpose of the Commerce Clause and the Role of the Market
Participant Doctrine
The history of the Commerce Clause is long, and the Clause has
been the subject of much litigation. The Clause has become one of
the most important grants of authority in the Constitution. In the
words of Justice Stone, "the Commerce Clause and the wise inter-
pretation of it, perhaps more than any other contributing element,
have united to bind the several states into a nation." 9 On the other
hand, the history of the market participant doctrine is not so long,
nor has the doctrine been extensively litigated.
A. Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution affirma-
tively grants to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."2 0 The Commerce Clause grants Congress exclusive power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 2' Additionally, the Clause
carries the negative implication that states may not regulate inter-
state commerce.12 This negative implication operates even in the ab-
sence of Congressional action; therefore, it is often referred to as the
"dormant" Commerce Clause.
2 3
State action may, however, affect interstate commerce. While
interstate regulation by states is prohibited, there may be instances
in which a state may, by exercising a necessary power, affect inter-
state commerce. 24 To determine whether state action violates the
19. Harlan F. Stone, Fifty Years Work of the United States Supreme Court, 14
A.B.A.J. 428, 430 (1928).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. See Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299 (1852).
22. Helson, 279 U.S. 245; Cooley, 53 U.S. 299.
23. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
24. E.g.,,Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
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dormant Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme Court has
developed a balancing test, weighing the interests of the state and
the means chosen to accomplish its end against the rights affected
and the burden on interstate commerce.
2 5
While the test requires balancing, the test is weighed heavily
against state actions that tend to discriminate against out-of-state
interests because they are viewed as highly suspect .2 Therefore, they
most often result in a determination that they violate the Commerce
Clause.2 7 This conclusion is the result of the Supreme Court's obser-
vation that since out-of-state interests are unrepresented in the
state's political process, their only protection against discrimination
lies in the Commerce Clause.28 The Court has repeatedly struck
down state statutes pursuing the legitimate goal of fostering local
economic interests as inconsistent with the underlying principles of
the Commerce Clause because those statutes attempted to limit ac-
cess to local markets.29
In fact, the Commerce Clause was created substantially to rem-
edy the perceived defect in the Articles of Confederation that al-
lowed such state action.30 The Clause reformed a nation of discrimi-
natory, self-protective, and retaliatory states engaged in destructive
trade wars with one another. The drafters of the Clause decided that
the source of the problems of the Articles of Confederation stemmed
from state governments which had been too responsive to local eco-
nomic interests in the absence of a central government capable of
economically unifying the several states. 31 The drafters of the Con-
stitution decided that the remedy was to shift legislative authority of
such matters to Congress, a national body in which competing eco-
nomic factions would neutralize one another arid thereby free com-
merce from stifling regulation. 2
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
25. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. Arizona, 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Southern Pacific, 325
U.S. 761.
26. See, e.g., Cities Services, 340 U.S. 179; Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761.
27. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comn'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); A
& P Tea Co. v. Cottrel, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935).
28. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945); Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. at 185 n.2.
29. E.g., A & P Tea Co., 424 U.S. 366; Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,
375 U.S. 361 (1964); Baldwin, 294 U.S. 511.
30. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : 6-3, at 321 (1978).
31. Id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 45-47 (1913).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison); FARRAND, supra note 31, at 140, 208;
TRIBE, supra note 30.
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Advantages of free trade between the states include reduced
prices and greater quantity of goods for the consumer, resulting in a
higher standard of living for the states involved."3 The framers of the
Commerce Clause recognized these principles and desired to pre-
serve these gains from trade.34 In the words of Justice Cardozo:
The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political
philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the the-
ory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim to-
gether, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.35
B. Market Participant Doctrine
In 1976, the Supreme Court created the market participant
doctrine in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co.3 1 In Hughes, the Su-
preme Court refused to subject the actions of the State of Maryland
to Commerce Clause scrutiny because it determined that the State
was acting not as a regulator of commerce but as a "market partici-
pant."'37 The case involved a challenge to a Maryland statutory
scheme under which the state purchased crushed automobile hulks
from in-state scrap processors at a premium price in order to help rid
the State of derelict cars. 38 Virginia scrap processors asserted a
Commerce Clause violation when Maryland refused to buy scrap
cars from out-of-state processors., 9
The Court determined that Maryland was not interfering with
the natural functioning of an interstate market, but was merely par-
ticipating in the market as a purchaser.40 As such, it could choose
with whom it would do business. 41 The Court further reasoned that
since the Commerce Clause has historically been directed only at
33. See PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 906-10 (1989). This was
the popular political economic philosophy at the time of the writing of the Constitution. See
ADAM SMITH. AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
Book IV, chs. ii, V (1776). The theory asserted by Smith was later refined by economist
David Ricardo. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (3d ed. 1821). Sup-
port for this theory and the stated conclusion of the benefits of free trade still prevail today.
See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. II (Alexander Hamilton); CHARLES BEARD. AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ch. VI, at 175 (1935). See
also H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
35. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
36. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
37. Id. at 806.
38. Id. at 796-99.
39. Id. at 801-02.
40. Id. at 806-07.
41. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1992
regulatory and taxing actions, the Clause should not apply to state
decisions in distributing government largesse.' 2
The market participant doctrine was next applied in Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake.43 In Reeves, a state-owned cement plant suspended
sales to out-of-state buyers in favor of in-state buyers during a ce-
ment shortage. Again, the Court determined that the State of South
Dakota was a market participant and not a regulator. 44 It therefore
declined to subject its actions to Commerce Clause scrutiny.45
The decision of White v. Massachusetts Council of Construc-
tion Employers, Inc.4' added no clarity to an already hazy distinc-
tion between "participant" and "regulator." In that case, the Mayor
of Boston issued an executive order requiring all construction
projects funded by city funds to be performed by a work force of
which at least half were residents of Boston. 47 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts invalidated the order as an unconstitutional
violation of the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.48 The court refused to apply the market participant excep-
tion after it determined the city's actions to be substantially different
from the preference based market participation in Hughes and
Reeves.49 It found the exception inapplicable because the city ex-
tended its market power beyond the initial market.
50
The United States Stipreme Court reversed and applied the
market participant doctrine. 51 The Court's decision centered upon an
analysis of the source of funds used in the construction projects. It
carefully framed the issues around the three possible funding combi-
nations for projects under the executive order: (1) the validity of the
order as applied to projects funded solely by the city, (2) the validity
of the order as applied to projects funded by a combination of city
and federal funds, and (3) the validity of the order as applied to
projects funded by a combination of city and private funds.52 The
Court had no difficulty applying the market participant doctrine to
42. Id. at 807-08.
43. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
44. Id. at 440.
45. Id.
46. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
47. Id. at 205 n.l.
48. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d
346 (Mass. 1981), rev'd, White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983).
49. Id. at 354.
50. Id.
51. White, 460 U.S. 204.
52. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 209
(1983).
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the first issue.5" On the second issue, the Court upheld the validity of
the order only after finding that the federal regulations governing
the federal funds were compatible with the executive order.", Issue
three was expressly left undecided.
55
The concerns of the lower court were championed by Justice
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion." Justice Blackmun agreed with
the Massachusetts court that the Mayor's order was a direct attempt
to govern private economic relationships beyond the market in which
the city participated.57 The majority summarily dismissed this criti-
cism with the generalization that in an informal sense, everyone af-
fected by the order was "working for the city."
58
The Supreme Court began to define the outer parameters of the
doctrine in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.5
That case involved a regulation of the State of Alaska requiring all
purchasers of timber taken from state lands to process that timber
within the state prior to export. 60 The Court found this policy to be a
"downstream" regulation of interstate commerce rather than mere
participation in commerce. 6 Therefore, the doctrine was unavailable
to protect such action from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.62
The Court then declared the regulation a clear violation of the Com-
merce Clause.6 a
Guidance for future determinations of the boundaries of the
market participant doctrine can be gleaned from Wunnicke. Clearly,
the doctrine does not allow states to impose any conditions that they
have the economic power to dictate. 4 Further, such requirements
are not validated by the mere fact that the state imposes them upon
53. Id.
54. Id. at 213-14. It should be noted that the Court did not apply the market participant
exception to projects funded partly with federal funds. The Court used Commerce Clause
scrutiny to determine whether the order was sanctioned by federal regulations. While not ex-
pressly stated, it appears that the Court found the market participant exception inapplicable
here, resulting in the need to engage in Commerce Clause scrutiny.
55. Id. at 209.
56. While Justice Blackmun supported the market participant doctrine as part of the
majority opinion in Alexandria Scrap and as the author of Reeves, the Justice feels compelled
to draw the outer boundary of its application here. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 216-25 (1983) (Blackmun, J. & White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 218-19.
58. Id. at 211 n.7.
59. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
60. Id. at 84-86.
61. Id. at 97-98.
,62. Id.
63. Id. 99-100.
64. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984).
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a party with whom it is in contractual privity. 65 The outer limit of
the market participant doctrine is defined by the market. While the
doctrine allows a state to impose some burdens on commerce within
a market in which it is a participant, it can go no further.66 A state
may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or con-
tract, that have a substantial regulatory effect out;side of that partic-
ular market without invoking Commerce Clause scrutiny.6"
The definition of the "market" must be relattively narrow. The
danger in defining the market too broadly is that the Commerce
Clause rule - states may not impose substantial burdens on inter-
state commerce even if they act with the permissible purpose of fos-
tering local industry - may be "swallow[ed] up." 68 Overly broad
definitions of markets would give states the ability to impact indus-
tries and transactions beyond those in which they are participating.
The market participant exception would become a loophole, allowing
states to achieve regulatory, and even protectionist, goals while dodg-
ing Commerce Clause scrutiny.
The role of the market participant doctrine should be held in
mind when analyzing state action. First, it must be recognized that
the doctrine is an exception to Commerce Clause scrutiny and not a
part of it. 9 Therefore, an intellectually honest application of the
doctrine will obviate the need for any analysis of the burden a par-
ticular action places on interstate commerce. 0 Also, an intellectually
honest application of the doctrine will obviate the need for any anal-
ysis of whether the state action violates a federal statute expressly
prohibiting regulation of interstate commerce.7 Theoretically, if a
state action is deemed "participation" and not "regulation", the ac-
tion can burden interstate commerce to any deg:ree even if Congress
has acted to clearly prohibit state regulation of interstate commerce




68. Id. at 97-98.
69. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204
(1983); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
70. See White, 460 U.S. 204. "Impact on out-of-state residents figures in the equation
only after it is decided that the city is regulating the market rather than participating in it, for
only in the former case need it be determined whether any burden on interstate commerce is
permitted by the [Clommerce [C]lause." Id. at 210.
71. This appears to be the reason why the Court expressly applied the market partici-
pant doctrine to projects funded with city money, but omitted any such application as to
projects funded by both city and federal funds. Instead, the Court moved to Commerce Clause
scrutiny and found the latter expressly sanctioned by federal regulation. White, 460 U.S. at
215.
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III. "Buy American" Statutes
"Buy American" statutes are not rare, nor are they new. At
least eleven states have statutes similar to Pennsylvania's Steel Prod-
ucts Procurement Act. 71 Additionally, at least nineteen more states
have "buy local" statutes that preclude the purchase by state agen-
cies of goods produced outside of the state and consequently outside
of the United States. 73 In addition to formal statutes, it appears that
other states give preference to American-made goods in public con-
tract bids as a matter of policy.
74
Given this substantial body of law, it is curious that few courts
have considered the validity of such statutes with respect to the
Commerce Clause. The absence of litigation may be attributable to
a lack of diligent enforcement of the statutes.7 5 Only recently have
opponents of the Steel Act, enacted in 1978, challenged it as viola-
tive of the Commerce Clause in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Penn-
sylvania.76 However, the Steel Act appears to enjoy wide adherence
at the state and local level.
77
The only "buy American" statute case prior to Trojan Technol-
ogies to address the issue of validity under the Commerce Clause in
light of the market participant doctrine was K.S.B. Technical Sales
Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission.78 It was
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court just one year after Alex-
72. See ALA. CODE § 39-3-4 et seq. (1987 Supp.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1801 et
seq. (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-16-8-2 et seq. (West 1984); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. § 12-401 et seq. (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (1969); N.J. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40 A: 11-18 (West 1973); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 146 (1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN,
§ 153.011 (1987); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1881 et seq. (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2.1 et seq.
(1984); W. VA. CODE § 5-19-1 et seq. (1987).
73. See ALA. CODE § 41-16-57(b) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 36.20.010 (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-242-(1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-18-101 et seq. (1973); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 283.03 (West 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.1 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-2184
(West 1968); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 1816 (10) (West Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-5-
23 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 8.280 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-5 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-59 (1978); ND. CENT. CODE § 48-02-10 (1978); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 11 (1964);
S.C. CODE § 1-1-410 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 5-19-6 (1974); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 664-2 (Vernon 1964); VA. CODE § 11-20.1 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
39.24.020 (1972).
74. See Henry A. Berliner, Note, State "Buy American" Policies - One Vice, Many
Voices, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 584, 585-88 (1964) (discussing a 1964 survey by the National
Association of State Purchasing Officials of state bidding and purchasing practices).
75. J. Allen Miller, Note, Foreign Commerce and State Power: The Constitutionality of
State Buy American Statutes, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 111-12 (1979).
76. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, Ill S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
77. This is the author's observation from speaking with various officials and attorneys
involved in state and local construction contracting.
78. 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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andria Scrap. In K.S.B., the Court rejected a Commerce Clause at-
tack on a New Jersey "buy American" statute.71
The decision centered on the exception to the Commerce Clause
newly created by the Court in Alexandria Scrap."° The New Jersey
Court reasoned that since New Jersey was acting not as a regulator
but as a participant, the Commerce Clause did not prohibit the ac-
tion."1 After concluding that Alexandria Scrap was controlling, the
Court rejected an argument that since the burden was on foreign
commerce rather than on interstate commerce, closer scrutiny was
called for than that utilized in Alexandria Scrap.2 To arrive at this
conclusion, the Court relied on earlier Supreme Court decisions
making no distinction between interstate and foreign commerce.8
Some commentators have criticized this reasoning, especially in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions.84 The court's contention in
K.S.B. that there is no need to differentiate between analysis of for-
eign commerce and analysis of interstate commerce has been explic-
itly rejected.8 In distinguishing between the analysis of interstate
commerce and foreign commerce, the Supreme Court has stressed
the need for uniform treatment of foreign commerce and concern for
avoiding foreign retaliation against American commerce.8 6
While the market participant doctrine has developed in cases
involving interstate commerce, 7 an unrestrained view of the doc-
79. Id. at 784-89.
80. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
81. K.S.B., 381 A.2d at 788.
82. Id.
83. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774, 788 (N.J. 1977) (citing The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847)), appeal
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). This conclusion now appears to be contrary to the prevailing
view of the Supreme Court; reliance on these early decisions seems misplaced. See Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (stricter scrutiny applied to a state prop-
erty tax when applied to foreign commerce).
84. See Kenworthy, Note, State Buy-American Laws - Invclidity of State Attempts to
Favor American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REv. 389, 403 (1980) (criticizing K.S.B. in light of
Japan Line); Miller, supra note 75, at 118-26 (proposing a distinction between application of
market participant doctrine to interstate commerce and to foreign commerce).
85. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 446.
86. Id. at 448-50.
87. See South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984);
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Note,
however, that in both Reeves and Wunnicke, the Court pointed out that Commerce Clause
scrutiny may be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged. Reeves, 447
U.S. at 437 n.9; Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82. In neither case, though, did the Court suggest what,
if any, effect this would have on the application of the market participant exception. In Reeves,
the Court specifically singled out "buy American" statutes by noting that it had no occasion to
explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the foreign Commerce Clause or the
constitutionality of such statutes. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9. One possible inference from this
is that application of the doctrine may be less liberal when state action affects foreign
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trine's foundational logic appears to make the doctrine applicable
even to actions affecting foreign commerce. The Supreme Court's
distinction between interstate and foreign commerce is based on the
burden and harmful effect of state interference in foreign trade.88
Theoretically, under the market participant doctrine, a court will
never reach this analysis. Once the state is found to be "participat-
ing" rather than "regulating," it is exempt from Commerce Clause
scrutiny.89
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania90 essentially followed
the result and reasoning of K.S.B.. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals dismissed several challenges to the Steel Act, including a Com-
merce Clause challenge. 92 The court determined the issue to be the
one expressly reserved by the Supreme Court in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake,9" namely whether state "buy American" statutes violate the
Commerce Clause or are permissible under the market participant
doctrine. 94 The Circuit Court held that the Steel Act was the Com-
monwealth's participation in the market and therefore was not sub-
ject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. 95
IV. Market Participant Doctrine Inapplicable to the Steel Act
Given the Supreme Court's decisions creating the market par-
ticipant doctrine and the New Jersey Court's application of the doc-
trine in K.S.B.,9" the central inquiry into the Steel Act in Trojan
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania7 was whether Pennsylvania's ac-
tions constituted regulation of or participation in the market.9 8 Al-
though the act in K.S.B. was substantially similar to the Steel Act,
subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have more clearly de-
fined the market participant exception and demonstrate its inapplica-
commerce.
88. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-50 (1979).
89. See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82; White, 460 U.S. 204; Reeves, 447 U.S. 429; Alexandria
Scrap, 426 U.S. 794.
90. 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 2814 (1990).
91. The Circuit Court only cursorily cited K.S.B. in a footnote. Id. at 910 n.l . How-
ever, the general reasoning is similar.
92. Id. at 910.
93. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980).
94. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 910.
95. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 909-13 (3d Cir. 1990);
cert. denied, I I S. Ct. 2814 (1990).
96. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
97. Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d 903.
98. Id. See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980).
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bility in such instances.9 Two aspects of the Steel Act place it
outside of the scope of immunity created by the market participant
exception. First, the Act is binding on all entities functioning for a
governmental purpose within the borders of the Commonwealth, re-
gardless of their relationship to the Commonwealth government. 100
Second, the Act constitutes vertical restraints on the free flow of
commerce outside the market in which the Commonwealth is
participating. °10
A. Distinction Between State and Local Government
The provisions of the Steel Act apply to all "public agencies." 102
For purposes of the Act, "public agencies" encompass all govern-
mental entities within the borders of the Commonwealth. 0 3 The Act
governs such diverse transactions as the building of a student union
or a dormitory by a state-owned university"'4 and the building or
repair of a sewer or water system by a local sewer or water
authority. 05
Analyzing the applicability of the market participant doctrine to
such transactions requires an understanding of the Supreme Court's
analysis in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Em-
99. K.S.B. was decided in 1977. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984), White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204
(1983), and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), were decided after 1977 and have
further defined the market participant doctrine.
100. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
102. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1884 (Supp. 1991).
103. Section § 1886 provides:
"Public agency".
(1) the Commonwealth and its departments, boards, commissions and agencies;
(2) counties, cities, boroughs, townships, school districts, and any other govern-
mental unit or district;
(3) the State Public School Building Authority, the State Highway and Bridge
Authority, and any other authority now in existence or he:.eafter created or or-
ganized by the Commonwealth;
(4) all municipal or school or other authorities now in existence or hereafter
created or organized by any county, city, borough, township or school district or
combination thereof; and
(5) any and all other public bodies, authorities, officers, agencies or instrumen-
talities, whether exercising a governmental or proprietary function.
Id. § 1886." ' '
104. Section 1886 provides: "'Public works.' Any structure, building, highway, water-
way, street, bridge, transit system, airport or other betterment, work or improvement whether
of a permanent or temporary nature and whether for governmental or proprietary use .
Id.
105. Id. Also, note that the Act governs every contract for the "construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, repair, improvement, or maintenance of public works." 73 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1884(a).
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ployers, Inc.'06 Recall that in White, the preference was established
by the city and the Court framed three issues based on the possible
funding combinations for projects covered by the executive order: (1)
whether the order was valid for projects funded entirely by city
funds; (2) whether the order was valid as applied to projects funded
by a combination of city and federal funds and; (3) whether the or-
der was valid as applied to projects funded by a combination of city
and private funds. 10 7 While the first two issues resulted in the order
being upheld, the Court expressly declined to rule on the third is-
sue. 108 The third issue is the issue that must be addressed in terms of
the Steel Act.
While the funds used in many construction projects purportedly
covered by the Act are not the equivalent of "private funds" in
White," 9 they are also qualitatively different than typical Common-
wealth funds. The key distinction is the source of the funds used in
the project. The Supreme Court appears to be placing emphasis on
whether the entity establishing the preference is the entity expending
the funds. As noted earlier, when the project involved federal funds
in addition to city funds, the Court did not apply the market partici-
pant doctrine, but instead found such preference authorized by fed-
eral law." 0
This concern in White over the source of funds appears to be a
direct result of the foundational logic of the market participant doc-
trine. Under the doctrine, a state may enter the market and partici-
pate as a buyer or seller, distributing its money or goods as it deems
appropriate."' It is quite another situation'when the state enters the
market and mandates a preference in transactions of other entities.
Clearly, local government entities may establish preferences in
their transactions. These actions are permissible under the market
participant doctrine." 2 However, the Steel Act is different. The Steel
Act is an attempt by the Commonwealth to regulate transactions
106. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
107. Id. at 209. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
108. As previously noted, the Court applied the market participant doctrine to the first
and second issue and ruled that the order was valid as expressly sanctioned by federal regula-
tion. The Court placed great significance on the source of funds used. Apparently the market
participant exception did not apply to projects funded jointly by city and federal funds. See
supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
109. See White, 460 U.S. at 209.
110. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
I11. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Co., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
112. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204
(1983) (contract preferences established by the City of Boston upheld in city-financed con-
struction projects as "market participation").
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and funds of other governmental entities over which it normally has
no control or interest. The Commonwealth, which imposes the re-
quirements, is not the entity participating in many of the transac-
tions, but rather is the regulator of those entities that are the
participants.
For example, the Steel Act applies to contracts made by state-
owned universities for the construction of student unions or dormito-
ries. 113 Appropriations from the Commonwealth's annual budget are
not used to fund the construction of student unions or dormitories.114
It is incongruous for the Commonwealth not to fund such projects
while claiming to be a market participant in the construction market
for such projects.
Although state-owned universities have traditionally been con-
sidered part of the executive branch of the Commonwealth govern-
ment under the Department of Education, 1 5 the universities operate
with substantial autonomy."16 When a university desires to build a
dormitory, a request is made by the university to the Board of Gov-
ernors of the State System of Higher Education to issue a bond in an
amount sufficient to cover the project." 7 The bond is not a debt of
the Commonwealth. Sole liability under the bond lies with the assets
of the State System of Higher Education." 8 The funds used to repay
the debt under the bond are raised through fees imposed on students
by the local university where the dormitory is being constructed.""
As stated earlier, no funds appropriated to the university by the
Commonwealth are used in the construction. 20 It seems inaccurate
to consider the Commonwealth a market participant in a transaction
113. Pennsylvania's state system of universities apparently falls under the Act's broad
definition of "public agency." See supra note 103. The author served on the Board of Gover-
nors of the State System of Higher Education from June 1987 to May 1989, had occasion to
be involved in such projects, and is aware that the System does feel compelled to comply with
the Steel Act.
114. It is the policy of the State System of Higher Education's Board of Governors that
appropriations from the Commonwealth will not be used to sustain "auxiliary enterprises"
such as dormitories and student unions. Auxiliary enterprises must be self-sustained through
user fees, fees imposed on students, or private financial sources.
115. See Op. PA. Att'y Gen. 126 (1972); Op. PA. Att'y Gen. 271 (1966).
116. Since 1983, state-owned universities have operated as the State System of Higher
Education. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20-2002-A (Supp. 1991). The System exists as a corpo-
ration and exercises corporate powers as allowed by the incorporating legislation. Id. § 20-
2003. The Board of Governors is the governing body that exercises the System's corporate
power is . Id. § 20-2004-A. While the members of this Board are appointed by the Governor of
the Commonwealth or are members due to their positions in Commonwealth government, the
Commonwealth has no administrative control over the decisions of the Board. Id.
117. See supra note 113.
118. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20-2003-A(b)(3) (Supp. 1991).
119. See supra note 113.
120. See supra note 114.
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in which it provides no financial support, has no liability, and in
which it has no supervisory or contractual role.12
A clearer example of the inappropriateness of viewing the Com-
monwealth as a market participant is the operation of municipal au-
thorities 22 to which the Steel Act expressly applies. 2 a Municipal au-
thorities are viewed formally as independent agencies of the
Commonwealth. 24 This is a somewhat strained view given the fact
that authorities are created by and receive at least their initial finan-
cial support from local municipalities. 125 Municipal authorities are
commonly created by the local municipality to serve a function that
would normally be the duty of the municipality, such as operating
sewer, water, or mass transit systems. The Commonwealth exercises
no direct administrative control over the operation of the authorities
other than providing the enabling legislation under which they incor-
porate. 26 To simply conclude that municipalities and municipal au-
thorities are subsections of the Commonwealth government, merely
because the General Assembly provides the statutes under which
they exist, would add nothing to the present discussion. The same
could be said of private corporations which also are incorporated
under state statute and exist only with the permission of the General
Assembly.' 27 No one would conclude that private corporations are
subsections of Commonwealth government.
Municipal authorities, like municipalities themselves, exist in
some form between that of a private corporation and that of a state
government. In pre-Blackstone England, there was one body of cor-
porate law that governed all public and private chartered entities. 28
121. While Commonwealth agencies depend on the Department of General Services for
approval, planning, and supervision of construction projects, the State System of Higher Edu-
cation does not. See 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20-2003-A.I (Supp. 1991 No. 4) (Act No. 1990-
103). With the recent enactment of Act 103 of 1990, the System has complete authority to
execute and administer contracts for the construction and repair of university facilities, includ-
ing dormitories. Id.
122. A municipal authority is a political and corporate body created by a municipality
under the Municipality Authorities Act. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 301-22 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
123. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1886 (Supp. 1991) (definition of "public agency", No. 4).
124. Commonwealth v. Erie Metro. Trans. Auth., 281 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1971). However,
this appears not to be an obvious conclusion. Compare Fox Chapel Auth. v. O.H. Martin, 116
P.L.J. 103 (1968); Curtioff v. Municipal Auth. of Westmoreland, 40 West 203 (1959).
125. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303 (Supp. 1991).
126. See infra note 133.
127. See Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 2814 (1990).
128. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (1967). "Every charter of incorporation . . . shall be
deemed and taken to be subject to the power of the legislature . . . to alter, revoke or annul
the same, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious to the citizens of the commonwealth;
. .Id.
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Over the years the law began distinguishing public entities from pri-
vate entities, and the two are now viewed differently.1 29 Public corpo-
rations have assumed a more governmental nature. In fact, the
"home rule" movement that began with the Missouri Constitution of
1875 was motivated substantially by a desire to ease the burden on
the state government.130 However, the daily business of a municipal-
ity or municipal authority operates in complete autonomy. The state
governing structure exercises no administrative control over its
operation.131
Indeed, courts will treat municipalities differently than they
treat states, depending on. the issue involved. One of the most illus-
trative examples of this is the Supreme Court's treatment of local
governments under the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.
While local government bodies are considered equivalent to states
for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, local gov-
ernments are not considered equivalent to states and do not receive
the sovereign immunity that the Eleventh Amendment affords to
"states. 132
When dealing with economics, as the Commerce Clause and the
market participant doctrine do, courts should look to the economic
reality of the relationship between states and local government enti-
ties. As already discussed, the economic reality is that local munici-
palities act in the market with complete autonomy from the state in
which they are located.1 33 At least one circuit court has recognized
this fact.
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
recognized in WC.M Window Co., Inc. v. Bernardi1 3 4 that there is
an "analytical and qualitative" difference between states and local
government entities. 135 W.C.M. dealt with an Illinois state statute
requiring local governments only to hire contractors for public works
that solely employ Illinois residents. 136 The court recognized that the
market participant doctrine would have upheld a state statute which
129. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWv 526 (1985).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
133. While municipal authorities are required to make certain financial disclosures in
reports to the Department of Community Affairs, the Department exercises no power over the
authority's finances. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 310 (Supp. 1991). The governing power of the
authority rests solely with the authority's board. Id. § 309.
134. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
135. Id. at 496.
136. Id. at 489.
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imposed preferences on state financed construction projects. 37 How-
ever, when the state requires preferences for local government con-
struction projects that the state does not finance, the state becomes a
regulator, and the market participant exception does not apply.'3 8
When a municipality or an authority created by it contracts for
the construction or repair of a water or sewer system, the municipal-
ity issues a bond to finance the project.139 Repayment of the bond
generally occurs through the collection of user fees from the custom-
ers of the system. The municipal bond is not a debt of the Common-
wealth, 10 and no appropriations from the Commonwealth go to its
repayment."" The Commonwealth is not contractually nor adminis-
tratively involved in the construction project. Again, given this loose
relationship between the Commonwealth and municipalities and mu-
nicipal authorities, it seems inaccurate to view the Commonwealth as
a participant in the market for water or sewer system construction.
The municipal authority is the participant; the Commonwealth regu-
lates this participation.
The goal of the Steel Act is to eliminate competition for the
domestic steel industry in public works purchases."" This goal is ac-
complished by limiting the choices a local government unit may
make concerning where to purchase products. "' When competition
and choices are limited, higher prices result." Therefore, under the
Act, local governments must pay higher prices on average for their
public works. The profits from these higher prices go to the domestic
steel industry. Money is taken from local government units through
the payment of higher prices and distributed to domestic steel corpo-
rations in the form of profits. The economic result is the same as if
the Commonwealth imposed a tax on local government units and dis-
tributed the proceeds to domestic steel corporations. 45
137. Id. at 495.
138. Id. at 495-96. It should be noted that the Trojan Technologies court rejected this
reasoning of W.C.M., seeing no difference between local municipal corporations and central
state agencies. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2814 (1991).
139. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306(B)(e.l) (Supp. 1991).
140. Id. § 306(B)(t).
141. Id. § 306(c).
142. Under the Steel Act, local governments must purchase domestic products when
domestic products exist in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the contract, re-
gardless of the price of those products. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1884 (Supp. 1991).
143. Local governments may only purchase goods containing steel from manufacturers
who can certify that the steel was produced in the United States. Id. § 1884(a).
144. See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, ch. 23 (theory that com-
petitive markets lead to economic efficiency).
145. Whether the local government unit pays more money in the form of higher prices
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The General Assembly of Pennsylvania clearly intended this re-
sult when it enacted the Steel Act. By the Act's own admission, it is
an exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth to stimulate
the economic well-being of the Commonwealth. ' " While reasonable
minds can debate the desirability of this policy, there can be no
doubt that this is not the action of a mere market participant. This is
a typical exercise of a government's fiscal policy attempting to ma-
nipulate and regulate the economy.
B. Restraints on Interstate Commerce Outside the Market
The second reason that the market participant doctrine should
not apply to the Steel Act is found in South-Central Timber
Devevelopment, Inc. v. Wunnicke.147 In Wunnicke, the Supreme
Court established the outer boundaries of the market participant ex-
ception. Since the doctrine applies to participation in a market, the
breadth of the protection from Commerce Clause scrutiny necessa-
rily is defined by the market in which the state is participating." 8
The doctrine allows a state to impose burdens on commerce within a
market in which it participates, but the state cart go no further. 14 A
state may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or
contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market without invoking Commerce Clause scrutiny. 50
Pennsylvania's Steel Act clearly invokes the Supreme Court's
test for Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Steel Act imposes burdens
not only on the initial contractor for the public work, but also from
the general contractor through any subcontractors through manufac-
turers and suppliers all the way to the original processor of the raw
steel.
Recall the previous example of a municipal authority con-
tracting for the construction of a sewage system. The authority will
be allowed to contract with a general contractor only if it can certify
that the steel to be used was originally produced in the United
States.' In order to accomplish this, the general contractor must
or in the form of taxes, the impact on the government is the same. Whether a steel corporation
receives money in the form of profits on sales that it may not have had otherwise or in the
form of a direct government subsidy, the benefit to the corporation is the same. Both methods
are traditional exercises of government fiscal policy. See generally id. at 386-88.
146. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1882, 1883 (Supp. 1991).
147. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
148. Id. at 97.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1884(a) (Supp. 1991).
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contract only with subcontractors who can guarantee the origin of
any steel used."' Further, in many large projects it is not uncommon
for one subcontractor to employ another subcontractor. In that case,
similar verifications of steel origin will have to be made. Presumably,
some subcontractor will be employed to install a sewage treatment
plant for the system. This subcontractor can only buy disinfection
systems, pumps, meters, and piping from suppliers who can certify
that those items were obtained from manufacturers who used United
States steel. To do this, the supplier must obtain certification from
the manufacturer who assembled the disinfection system that all the
component parts in the system were purchased from manufacturers
who purchased their raw steel from steel producers in the United
States. Finally, the manufacturer of the component parts must cer-
tify that only United States steel was poured into the dies which
formed the particular component parts that were assembled into the
disinfection system which is eventually installed as part of the sew-
age system.1 53
The preceding example involves construction markets, manufac-
tured goods markets, and processed raw material markets. The per-
mutations of affected markets multiply as the complexity and size of
the project increases. This is not a strained application of the Act,
but merely an illustration of its intended result. The intent of the
Steel Act is to aid and promote the steel production industry. 54 The
Commonwealth is not a participant in the market for processed steel.
In order to effect this market, the Commonwealth places restraints
on parties within markets in which it may be a participant, knowing
that these restraints will be passed "upstream" and will eventually
reach the steel production industry.1 55 This use of leverage by a state
in one market to exert a regulatory effect in another market is pre-
cisely the conduct the Court refused to sanction under the market
participant exception in Wunnicke. 56 This is "upstream" regulation.
An attempt may be made to distinguish the "upstream" regula-
tion of the Steel Act from the "downstream" regulation objected to
in Wunnicke.1 51 However, this is a distinction without a difference.
152. Section 1885(a) calls for the recovery of payments directly from a contractor, sub-
contractor, manufacturer, or supplier who fails to comply with the Act. Id. § 1885(a).
153. Note that the products shall be determined to be United States steel products if at
least 75% of the cost of the articles, materials, and supplies have been mined, produced, or
manufactured in the United States. Id. § 1886 (definition of "steel products").
154. Id. § 1883. See supra note 9.
155. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1884 (Supp. 1991).
156. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984).
157. Id. at 99.
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While the Court's analysis of the facts in Wunnicke necessarily dealt
with the "downstream" regulation before it, the limits framed for
the market participant exception are the boundaries of the market in
which the state is participating.' 58 There is no reason to depart from
this rule merely because the leveraging is directed at an "upstream"
market rather than a "downstream" market.
Support for this conclusion is found in Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc.'59 Citing a line of antitrust decisions, Justice Blackmun noted
that conditioning a willingness to deal with potential bargaining
partners on their derivative refusals to deal with others is particu-
larly suspect where those whom the trader attempts to isolate are its
competitors. 0 0 Blackmun correctly viewed the executive order as fol-
lows: those wishing to deal with the city government must refuse to
hire non-residents who are competing with citizens for jobs. 61 This
is "upstream" regulation similar to that found in the Steel Act. As
Justice Blackmun warned, "This anti-competitive and suspect goal
will be present whenever a unit of state or local government requires
recipients of public contracts or government subsidies to deal only
with that government's constituents."' 62
While the majority in White refused to follow Justice Black-
mun's logic,' 63 it was not because of any distinction between "up-
stream" and "downstream" regulation. The majority merged the
market for construction contractors with the labor market for con-
struction workers, summarily stating that everyone affected by the
order was in an informal sense "working for the city."'6 4
This merging of markets for market participant analysis ap-
pears inappropriate especially in light of the Court's mandate in
Wunnicke, just one year later, that the market is to be narrowly de-
fined. "'65 This merging of markets would be particularly inappropri-
ate in the case of Pennsylvania's Steel Act. The markets for con-
158. Id. at 97.
159. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
160. Id. at 219 n.4. Given the perceived close connection between the steel industry and





164. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983). This is a strange view of employer-employee and principa.-independent contractor re-
lationships. The traditional view would be that employees of an independent contractor are just
that and not employees of the principal. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 467
F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Klein v. May Stern & Co., 19 A.2d 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941).
165. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984).
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struction of sewer systems, dormitories, and other public works are
not merely part of the processed steel market.
V. Commerce Clause Scrutiny of the Steel Act
As stated earlier, application of the market participant doctrine
will obviate any need to engage in Commerce Clause scrutiny. 66
However, a note on the analysis which the Steel Act would face is in
order. The Steel Act limits the amount of foreign products that may
be purchased by the Commonwealth, its agencies, and local govern-
ments.'67 The Act's principal impact is on foreign commerce.
The power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce are
granted to Congress in the same clause. 68 However, the United
States Supreme Court noted in Reeves' 6  and Wunnicke17 1 that
Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a re-
straint on foreign commerce is alleged.' One inference from this
language in Wunnicke may be that the market participant exception
will not be applied by the Court to statutes burdening foreign com-
merce.'72 Indeed, the presence of foreign commerce was noted by the
Court as a factor distinguishing Wunnicke from Reeves."'
The difference between the analysis required under the inter-
state Commerce Clause and the analysis required under the foreign
Commerce Clause is made clear in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles. 74 In Japan Line, the Supreme Court added two factors
to the traditional Commerce Clause balancing test where foreign
commerce is involved.1' The additional factor relevant to the Steel
Act is the possible impairment of federal uniformity in the area of
166. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
167. Under the Act, products containing foreign steel may not be purchased where do-
mestic substitutes exist in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the contract. 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1844 (Supp. 1991).
168. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
169. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
170. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
171. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 96; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9.
172. "We are buttressed in our conclusion that the restriction is invalid by the fact that
foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction." Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 100.
173. While the statute in Reeves was upheld as market participation, the statute in
Wunnicke was held invalid. Id. at 100. The Court specifically noted the presence of foreign
commerce, a natural resource, and restrictions on resale, all of which were not present in
Reeves. Id. at 96.
174. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
175. First, a court must inquire whether any tax creates a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation. Second, a court must inquire whether the state action prevents the
federal government from "speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments." Id. at 451.
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foreign trade. 171 Uniformity is essential in the sensitive area of for-
eign commerce that is so intimately connected to foreign relations.1"
State regulations burdening foreign commerce may spark retaliatory
trade action by foreign nations,1 78 targeted at the United States as a
whole. 179 Retaliation causes increased trade barriers, which in turn
result in the loss of gains from trade and deterioration in the eco-
nomic welfare of the nation. 180 Therefore, the entire nation would
suffer because of the action of one state. 18'
The appropriate test for the Steel Act is a balancing test. On
the side in favor of validation of the Act are Pennsylvania's interest
in promoting the state's economy 82 and the compatibility of the
means of the Act to that end. 83 On the side against the Act are the
nation's interests in the free flow of commerce,'"' the nation's inter-
est in federal uniformity in the area of foreign trade,8 5 and the bur-
den the Act places on this interest.' 86
As the Steel Act expressly and purposely discriminates against
foreign commerce, this balancing of factors will be subject to the
highest degree of scrutiny.187 The shielding of in-state industries
from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local pur-
pose.' 88 Economic protectionism is subject to such strict scrutiny that
it becomes virtually a per se rule of invalidity. 89
176. See id. at 449, 453-54; see also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976) (decided under the import-export clause). One of the major concerns of the Framers of
the Constitution was that the federal government must speak with one voice when regulating
foreign commerce. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285.
177. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448.
178. Id. at 450.
179. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979).
180. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 923.
181. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 450.
182. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1883 (Supp. 1991).
183. For discussion of the relation of the means to the end, see South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Compare Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (truck-length regulation upheld as substan-
tially related to safety) with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)
(plurality opinion in which truck-length regulation invalidated as not substantially related to
safety). However, the argument that New Jersey's "buy American" scheme was not related to
a legitimate state purpose because it had a nationalistic goal was expressly rejected. K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (N.J.
1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
184. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
185. See, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. 137; Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 168-72.
187. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrel, 424 U.S. 366
(1976).
188. E.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 ,1935).
189. E.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
"Buy AMERICAN" STATUTES
The Act substantially burdens foreign commerce. Any manufac-
turer who foresees the possibility that its products will be used in a
public work project in Pennsylvania must be concerned with the re-
quirements of the Steel Act.19 For a manufacturer's product to be
considered for purchase by the Commonwealth, its agencies, local
governments, or contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers in any
way engaged in public works, no more than 25 % of the product's
cost may be comprised of foreign steel.191 In mass production indus-
tries, this means that all products produced by a manufacturer who
wishes to sell some of his products for public works must meet this
requirement.192 Therefore, to provide for-the possibility of supplying
to public works, the manufacturer must confine foreign steel to 25 %
of its unit cost. This is so despite the fact that many of the units will
go to private use. This effectively places a ceiling, or import quota,
on foreign steel imports to manufacturers who wish to supply public
works.1 93 The spending by state and local governments on public
works is substantial. If this spending is multiplied by the spill-over
effects on some products sold for private consumption, the volume of
commerce effected is even more substantial.
Given the illegitimacy of the goal of local protectionism, the
clear intent and effect of discrimination, and the significant burden
on foreign commerce, the Steel Act will likely fail under Commerce
Clause scrutiny, absent the protection of the market participant doc-
trine.1 94 While this result may be bad for domestic steel producers,
this result upholds the purpose and spirit of the Commerce Clause 95
and would likely be more beneficial to local governments and
taxpayers. 96
VI. Conclusion
The intuitive appeal of "buy American" statutes is summed up
by a statement sometimes attributed to Abraham Lincoln: "I don't
190. The Act applies to contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, and suppliers. 73
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1885(a) (Supp. 1991).
191. Id. § 1886 (definition of "steel products").
192. This assumes a homogenous product so that one produced with foreign steel would
be indistinguishable from one produced with domestic steel.
193. For an explanation of the workings of quotas, see SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra
note 33, at 921-26. Quotas create economic inefficiency and economic loss for consumers. SAM-
UELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 923.
194. This caused the demise of a California "buy American" statute in a challenge de-
cided prior to the advent of the market participant doctrine. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Commissioners, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
195. See discussion supra notes 102-65 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 192.
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know much about the tariff. But I do know that when I buy a coat
from England, I have the coat and England has the money. But
when I buy a coat in America, I have the coat and America has the
money.1"197 While this mercantilist philosophy has long been rejected
as based on unsound economics,19 its allure still entices public policy
makers - including Pennsylvania's General Assembly. Pennsylva-
nia's Steel Products Procurement Act does not benefit the overall
economy of the Commonwealth; it merely increases profits of United
States steel corporations.199
Granted, the role of courts is not to examine the wisdom of stat-
utes, but merely to assess their constitutionality. 00 However, the
drafters of the Constitution placed the duty of forming United States
trade policy on the shoulders of the Congress, riot on the states.20 '
The courts should not shift this burden by summarily labeling such
state action "participation" rather than "regulation." To do so is to
ignore the clear purpose and effect of such state action.
"Buy American" statutes such as the Steel. Products Procure-
ment Act should at least face Commerce Clause scrutiny. While
such statutes will likely fail as violations of the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Commerce Clause was specifically enacted for this - to
facilitate an orderly nationwide scheme to govern interstate and for-
eign commerce. If the nation believes that such economic protection
is needed, Congress can and should deal with our nation's trade
problems on a national level with a global perspective, rather than
leaving national trade policy in the hands of state legislatures with
local perspectives. Such an approach would be more in line with the
tradition and spirit of the Commerce Clause than would straining to
label "participation" that which is actually "regulation."
Kenton R. O'Neil
197. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1881 er seq. (Supp. 1991); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra
note 33, at 926.
198. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 33, at 926.
199. Pennsylvania's Steel Act does appear unwise. When tariffs, quotas, or similar bur-
dens on trade are imposed, the economic loss to the consumer exceeds the revenue gained by
government plus the extra profits earned by producers. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note
33, at 923.
200. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water'Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774, 789 (N.J. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
